ABSTRACT

As a phenomenological concept, absorption refers to the ego's capacity to experience the world from a displaced standpoint. The paper traces the emergence and development of this concept in Husserl's and Fink's writings and demonstrates that while Fink conceived of absorption as a class of intuitive re-presentations, Husserl transformed it into a limit phenomenon, whose analysis calls for a new method. A careful study of absorption compels us to rethink fundamental themes in phenomenology: it forces us to broaden our understanding of sensuous intuition, reconceptualize the nature of self-awareness, stretch the limits of intuitive re-presentations, and rethink the portrayal of phenomenology as a metaphysics of presence. The paper demonstrates that absorbed experiences are characterized by a specific form of self-awareness, that they constitute a distinct type of intuitive re-presentations, that a new method is needed to investigate them, and that their analysis leads towards a phenomenology of the unconscious.

摘要

作为一个现象学的概念，吸收是指自我从一个置换的角度来体验世界的能力。本文追溯了这一概念在胡塞尔和芬克著作中的出现和发展，并论证了虽然芬克将吸收设想为一类直观的再现，但胡塞尔将其转化为一种极限现象，其分析需要一种新的方法。对吸收的仔细研究迫使我们重新思考现象学的基本主题：它迫使我们拓宽对感性直觉的理解，重新概念化自我意识的本质，扩展直觉再现的限制，重新思考将现象学描绘为存在的形而上学。该论文表明，吸收的经验以一种特定形式的自我意识为特征，