ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to link Locke’s use of “fiduciary trust” to the early seventeenth century debates about the limits of Charles I’s sovereignty. Specifically, this paper points to a striking congruence between Locke and Samuel Rutherford’s Lex Rex (1644). Anticipating similar formulations in the Second Treatise, Rutherford argues that unlike domestic relationships, which are governed by natural paternal affections (care), sovereign authority is unnatural and artificial. In stark contrast to prominent royalist positions of that day, Rutherford argues that fathers do not have the right to kill their sons and wives, specifically linking the source and limit of their authority to natural love and affection. This distinction sharply distinguishes paternal authority from fiduciary trust. The former is governed by the natural law and is derived from the implicit or psychic trust that emerges between those in loving relationships; the latter is a product of positive law and is built on a presumption of distrust. Locke builds on these arguments, particularly with regard to conjugal society. While co-parents will typically be bound together by care and affection, the risk of the husband’s neglect or overreach required that formal trust-mechanisms be put in place to assure the rights of the child (and wife) were not infringed. Like paternal authority, Locke’s conjugal society is another example of why political authority cannot be predicated on care.

摘要

本文的目的是将洛克对“信托”的使用与 17 世纪早期关于查理一世主权限制的争论联系起来。具体而言，本文指出了洛克和塞缪尔·卢瑟福( Samuel Rutherford) 的Lex Rex (1644)之间惊人的一致性。期待第二篇论文中的类似表述，卢瑟福认为，与受自然父爱（关怀）支配的家庭关系不同，主权权威是非自然和人为的。与当时显赫的保皇派立场形成鲜明对比的是，卢瑟福认为父亲无权杀死他们的儿子和妻子，特别是将他们权力的来源和限制与自然的爱和感情联系起来。这种区别将父权权威与受托信任明显区分开来。前者受自然法则支配，源自于恋爱关系中的人之间产生的内在或心理上的信任；后者是实在法的产物，建立在不信任的假设之上。洛克建立在这些论点之上，特别是关于婚姻社会的论点。虽然共同父母通常会因关怀和关爱而联系在一起，丈夫疏忽或过度干预的风险要求建立正式的信任机制，以确保孩子（和妻子）的权利不受侵犯。与父权权威一样，洛克的夫妻社会是政治权威不能以关怀为基础的另一个例子。