当前位置: X-MOL 学术The Journal of Legislative Studies › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
Strategic position taking: optimal strategy for Senate candidates in the Obama era
The Journal of Legislative Studies Pub Date : 2020-12-10 , DOI: 10.1080/13572334.2020.1852868
Neilan S. Chaturvedi 1 , Chris Haynes 2
Affiliation  

ABSTRACT

In this paper, we test the optimal position taking strategy for senators running for reelection vis-à-vis their party’s president. Using data from a survey experiment conducted using a national sample, we examine the responses towards three hypothetical Democrats: (i) ‘embracing’ or supportive of Barack Obama (ii.) ambiguous about their attitude towards Obama (iii.) ‘eschewing’ or opposed to Obama. Comparing participants exposed to the ambiguous and the embracing Democrat, we find some evidence of a difference in candidate preference, but little evidence to suggest that the strategy gains votes. Comparing participants exposed to the eschewing Democrat to the embracing Democrat, we find that the strategy does yield some gains but these are offset by losses amongst the base. Overall, these findings suggest that the optimal reelection strategy for Democratic candidates is to remain supportive, unless they are running in areas with a high concentration of Republicans—then the eschew strategy can yield some gains.



中文翻译:

战略定位:奥巴马时代参议院候选人的最优策略

摘要

在本文中,我们测试了竞选连任的参议员与其党内总统的最佳立场采取策略。使用使用全国样本进行的调查实验的数据,我们检查了对三个假设民主党人的反应:(i)“拥抱”或支持巴拉克奥巴马(ii)对奥巴马的态度模棱两可(iii)“回避”或反对奥巴马。比较暴露于模棱两可和拥抱民主党的参与者,我们发现一些证据表明候选人偏好存在差异,但几乎没有证据表明该策略获得选票。将接触民主党的参与者与拥抱民主党的参与者进行比较,我们发现该策略确实产生了一些收益,但这些收益被基数中的损失所抵消。全面的,

更新日期:2020-12-10
down
wechat
bug