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De Facto and De Jure in the Practice of Induction
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2021-01-07 , DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2020.1866478
Daniel Goldstick 1
Affiliation  

ABSTRACT

‘Simplicity’ comes up in different senses in scientific methodology. The simplicity criterion at issue here is relied on in all inductive inference, it’s argued. Therefore, it cannot be inductively learned—except by learners who already rely on it. The question whether one is warranted in relying on it is indeed in order, but we all are found on the affirmative side of the question in practice. On the one hand, there is arguably an epistemological lesson in this. On the other hand, there is the question what reality must be like objectively for reliance on simplicity to be so apt to pay off when it comes to forecasting the future.



中文翻译:

De Facto和De Jure在归纳实践中

摘要

在科学方法论中,“简单性”以不同的意义出现。有人认为,这里讨论的简单性标准是所有归纳推理所依赖的。因此,除非已经依靠它的学习者,否则不能归纳学习它。一个人是否值得依靠它的问题确实是有秩序的,但实际上我们都在该问题的肯定方面找到了我们。一方面,这可以说是认识论的教训。另一方面,存在一个问题,就是对于客观的现实,在预测未来时,对简单性的依赖必须易于获得回报。

更新日期:2021-03-16
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