ABSTRACT

Do lawyer fees influence lawyer behavior? The impact of lawyer fees on lawyer behavior has been discussed theoretically and anecdotally, mostly from an aspect of economic incentives. Yet little research has empirically examined this issue. This article aims to add one empirical study. I conducted a vignette experiment with 206 Japanese divorce lawyers. Scenarios of divorce disputes involving certain ethical dilemmas were used to measure partisanship. The description of fee arrangement in the scenarios varied to compare three conditions: (a) no specific description of lawyer fee (the control condition), (b) JPY 300 thousand retainer with additional JPY 300 thousand contingency (a typical fee arrangement in Japan), and (c) JPY 450 thousand retainer with no contingency (a lump-sum prepaid arrangement). I found that partisanship of lawyers became higher in conditions with fee descriptions, when they were conscious of (the existence of) the fee. This phenomenon was observed in condition (c) of a lump-sum prepaid fee arrangement as well as in condition (b) of a typical fee arrangement combining a retainer and contingency. The findings indicate that the reciprocity norm, rather than economic incentives, may have a power on the relationship between lawyer fees and lawyer behavior.

摘要

律师费会影响律师行为吗？律师费对律师行为的影响已经从理论上和轶事上进行了讨论，主要是从经济激励方面。然而，很少有研究对这个问题进行实证检验。本文旨在增加一项实证研究。我与 206 名日本离婚律师进行了一个小插曲实验。涉及某些道德困境的离婚纠纷场景被用来衡量党派之争。场景中对费用安排的描述各不相同，比较了三个条件：（a）没有具体描述律师费（控制条件），（b）30万日元的聘用金和额外的30万日元的应急费用（日本的典型费用安排） ，以及 (c) 450,000 日元的无意外费用的保证金（一次性预付安排）。我发现，当律师意识到（存在）费用时，在费用描述的条件下，他们的党派偏见变得更高。这种现象在一次性预付费用安排的条件 (c) 以及结合了固定费用和应急费用的典型费用安排的条件 (b) 中观察到。研究结果表明，互惠规范，而不是经济激励，可能对律师费用和律师行为之间的关系产生影响。