Abstract

We analyze the effect of the European Union Competition Authority’s block exemption towards R&D cooperatives in a horizontal market structure, valid as long as the combined product market share is not too large. Two less efficient firms attempt to catch up with a technological leader, and may use the safe harbour provided by the legislation. We consider when the incentives of the R&D-performing firms are aligned with those of consumers, and when increases in the market share limit improves welfare. We show that an effective policy within this framework might be elusive. The market share restriction must be set in order that it is optimal for firms to use the safe harbour, and that this leads to more R&D than under competition. Even in this case, further increases in the market share restriction can harm welfare. This has widespread implications for how the EU Competition authority should respond to calls for an increase in the market share restriction.

摘要

我们分析了欧盟竞争管理局对横向市场结构中研发合作社的集体豁免的影响，只要合并的产品市场份额不是太大就有效。两家效率较低的公司试图赶上技术领先者，并可能使用立法提供的安全港。我们考虑何时将研发绩效企业的激励与消费者的激励保持一致，以及何时增加市场份额限制会改善福利。我们表明，该框架内的有效政策可能难以捉摸。必须设置市场份额限制，以便公司使用安全港是最佳的，并且这会导致比竞争更多的研发。即使在这种情况下，进一步增加市场份额限制也会损害福利。