ABSTRACT

In Heidegger on Concepts, Freedom, and Normativity, Sacha Golob criticizes and offers an alternative to the standard interpretation of intentionality in Being and Time. According to Golob, the dominant reading’s derivation of propositional intentionality from practical intentionality fails on textual and philosophical grounds, so he develops a different approach that involves deriving propositional intentionality from prototype intentionality. In this essay, I offer an overview of dominant reading of intentionality in Being and Time and Golob’s alternative account, and then I criticize them both for attempting to derive propositional intentionality for some form of non-propositional intentionality. Finally, I offer my own ontological interpretation of intentionality by arguing that Heidegger’s aim in Being and Time is not to derive one form of intentionality from another but to describe the basic aspects of human existence that make any and all forms of intentionality possible.

摘要

在《关于概念，自由和规范的海德格尔》中，萨莎·高洛布（Sacha Golob）批评并提供了对《存在与时间》中意向性标准解释的另一种选择。根据Golob的说法，主要阅读是从实践意图上推导命题意图的，但从文本和哲学的角度来看都是失败的，因此他开发了另一种方法，其中涉及从原型意图推导命题意图。在本文中，我概述了《存在与时间》和Golob的替代性叙述中对意向性的主流阅读，然后我批评它们都试图导出。某种形式的非命题意图性的命题意图性。最后，我通过论证海德格尔在“存在与时间”中的目的不是从另一种形式衍生出一种意图，而是描述人类存在的基本方面，使任何一种形式和所有形式的意图成为可能，来提供自己对意图的本体论解释。