ABSTRACT

Pragmatic theories of truth need to pass the pragmatic test: they need to make a difference. Unfortunately, defenders of the pragmatic theory have rarely applied this test. I argue that a Deweyan pragmatic account of truth passes the test by identifying the political and epistemic dangers of certain types of social networks that create a durable consensus around false beliefs. To better understand Dewey’s account of truth I propose an excursion through Wittgenstein’s later views on knowledge and certainty.

中文翻译：

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当我们谈论真理时，我们在谈论什么：杜威、维特根斯坦和实用主义测试

摘要

实用主义的真理理论需要通过实用测试：它们需要有所作为。不幸的是，实用主义理论的捍卫者很少应用这个测试。我认为，杜威对真理的务实说明通过识别某些类型的社交网络的政治和认知危险，从而在错误信念周围形成持久的共识，从而通过了测试。为了更好地理解杜威对真理的描述，我提议通过维特根斯坦后来关于知识和确定性的观点进行一次游览。