ABSTRACT

Heightened tensions in Russia-West relations have signaled that the Arctic is no longer exempt from the tumult of geopolitics; however, an unrestrained militarization of the Arctic in response to the perception of a hostile Russia may be a hasty move. For the Arctic to remain a zone of cooperation, this will require a proper understanding of Russia's general foreign policy interests, how the Arctic fits into these goals, and the recognition that Russia is a major Arctic power and can therefore be expected to pursue its interests there. This paper presents a brief empirical overview of Russia's power interests as they relate to the Arctic, and tackles some of the assumptions about Russia that obstruct its consideration as a cooperative Arctic partner, notably the current narrative of Russia as willful disruptor of the global order. This paper attempts to clarify just what Russia's interests are and how these might relate to its defence and security initiatives in the Arctic. Cooperation between Canada and Russia in the Arctic will require a better appreciation of just what Russia's interests in the Arctic actually are, rather than presuming motives that imperil cooperation and risk raising the stakes of doing business in the region.

摘要

俄罗斯与西方关系的紧张局势加剧表明，北极不再不受地缘政治动荡的影响；然而，为了回应俄罗斯敌对的看法，无限制地将北极军事化可能是一个仓促的举动。北极要保持合作区的地位，就需要正确理解俄罗斯的总体外交政策利益，北极如何适应这些目标，并承认俄罗斯是北极的主要大国，因此可以期待追求其利益。那里。本文对俄罗斯与北极相关的权力利益进行了简要的实证概述，并解决了一些关于俄罗斯阻碍其作为北极合作伙伴考虑的假设，特别是当前将俄罗斯视为全球秩序的故意破坏者的说法。本文试图阐明俄罗斯的利益是什么，以及这些利益与它在北极的防御和安全举措有何关系。加拿大和俄罗斯在北极的合作需要更好地了解俄罗斯在北极的利益实际上是，而不是假设动机会危及合作并冒着增加在该地区开展业务的风险。