ABSTRACT Whereas several commentators have held that Kant’s argument for the postulate of private right fails insofar as it begs the question, I argue here that this criticism misses the mark. Critics have erroneously supposed that the postulate is designed to secure a right to a system of private property. In fact, Kant’s ambitions were more modest: to show that someone (be it an individual, a community, or a state) must be capable of enjoying dominion over external objects of choice. Understood this way, Kant’s argument does not beg the question. Rather, it establishes clearly that freedom requires human dominion over objects, a fact that not all parties to debates over property have recognized. In response to the objection that my interpretation leaves Kant’s account problematically indeterminate, I argue that the question of what system of property is justified cannot be settled from the armchair, independently of the history of acquisition.

中文翻译：

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私权公设与康德的半历史财产原理

摘要 尽管一些评论家认为康德关于私权假设的论证在回避问题的范围内是失败的，但我在这里认为这种批评没有抓住要点。批评者错误地认为，该假设旨在确保私有财产制度的权利。事实上，康德的野心更为温和：表明某人（无论是个人、社区还是国家）必须能够享受对外部选择对象的支配。这样理解，康德的论证并没有回避问题。相反，它清楚地确立了自由需要人类对物体的统治，这一事实并非所有关于财产的辩论各方都承认。为了回应我的解释使康德的解释有问题地不确定的反对意见，