ABSTRACT This article reconstructs Henri Bergson’s argument at the beginning of the second chapter of his Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience for his view that every idea of number involves space. It begins by criticizing previous interpretations of this view. Most controversially, it argues that Bergson’s view specifically relates to our ideas of what Bertrand Russell calls ‘pluralities’, i.e. particular trios, quadruples, etc., and not to our ideas of ‘abstract numbers’ such as 3 and 4. The article goes on to elucidate the premises of Bergson’s argument. It concludes that the first step in the argument is either invalid, or it turns on a premise that is plainly false, depending on how a particular scope ambiguity is resolved. It suggests that the second step in Bergson’s argument turns on the assumption that space and time differ in the following respect: while it is impossible for the same thing to be wholly present at different spatial locations, it is perfectly possible for the same thing to be wholly present at different temporal locations.

中文翻译：

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柏格森数

摘要 本文重构了亨利·柏格森在他的 Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience 的第二章开头的论点，因为他认为每一个数字概念都涉及空间。它首先批评先前对这种观点的解释。最具争议的是，它认为柏格森的观点特别涉及我们对伯特兰·罗素所说的“复数”的看法，即特定的三重奏、四重奏等，而不是我们对“抽象数字”的看法，例如 3 和 4。文章写道阐明柏格森论证的前提。它的结论是论证的第一步要么无效，要么基于一个明显错误的前提，这取决于特定范围歧义的解决方式。