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The (anti) politics of central banking: Monetary policy, class conflict and the limits of sovereignty in South Africa
Economy and Society ( IF 4.182 ) Pub Date : 2021-02-11 , DOI: 10.1080/03085147.2021.1841931
Jason Hickel 1
Affiliation  

Abstract

During the transition to democracy in the 1990s, the departing apartheid regime granted political power to the black majority but kept the main levers of economic policy insulated from the revolution. Control over the South African Reserve Bank (SARB; hereafter also Reserve Bank) was central to this strategy. The SARB was made private and independent, its mandate limited to maintaining ‘price stability’, and the financial sector was liberalized – all in line with neoliberal principles. The SARB represents itself as ‘apolitical’, and claims that independence is necessary to build investor trust. But since 2009, left-wing movements have argued that central bank policy is in fact political; that it ultimately benefits the rich at the expense of the poor. They want to renationalize the SARB and establish democratic control over finance and monetary policy, thus completing the revolution. This paper explores the history and politics of central banking in South Africa, including the role of African National Congress (ANC) decision-makers, to determine how and why the SARB become independent during the transition, and who benefits from this arrangement. I find that the Reserve Bank’s monetary policy does indeed have uneven distributional effects, and serves the interests of some class factions (specifically, speculative finance) over others. But I argue that the vision for a more democratic financial system may be difficult to actualize. Not because it is unrealistic, but because it fails to address the external pressures that overdetermine SARB policy. Ultimately, the Reserve Bank is beholden to powers that lie beyond the borders of the domestic political economy. Integration into global financial markets, and dependence on foreign investment, has severely curtailed South Africa’s economic sovereignty.



中文翻译:

中央银行的(反)政治:货币政策,阶级冲突和南非的主权界限

摘要

在1990年代向民主过渡期间,即将离任的种族隔离政权将政治权力授予了黑人多数,但保持了经济政策的主要杠杆与革命的隔离。对南非储备银行(SARB;以下也称为储备银行)的控制是该策略的核心。SARB成为私有和独立的,其职责仅限于维持“价格稳定”,并且金融部门自由化,所有这些都符合新自由主义原则。SARB代表自己是“非政治的”,并声称独立对于建立投资者的信任是必要的。但是自2009年以来,左翼运动一直在争论中央银行的政策实际上是政治性的。它最终使富人受益,却以穷人为代价。他们希望将SARB国有化,并建立对金融和货币政策的民主控制,从而完成革命。本文探讨了南非中央银行的历史和政治,包括非洲人国民大会(ANC)决策者的作用,以确定SARB在过渡期间如何独立,为何独立以及谁将从中受益。我发现储备银行的货币政策确实确实具有分配不均的影响,并且为某些阶级派别(特别是投机金融)的利益服务。但是我认为建立更民主的金融体系的愿景可能难以实现。不是因为它不切实际,而是因为它不能解决过度决定SARB政策的外部压力。最终,储备银行拥有超越国内政治经济边界的权力。融入全球金融市场以及对外国投资的依赖严重削弱了南非的经济主权。

更新日期:2021-02-24
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