ABSTRACT

One of the core issues where interpreters of Kant disagree concerns his alleged Noumenalism—the claim that the objects of our experience, which are in space and time, are underpinned by entities that are not spatio-temporal and that non-spatio-temporally cause our representations of empirical objects. Although there is much textual evidence in favour of Noumenalism, non-Noumenalists have also gathered a significant number of philosophical and exegetical challenges to such a reading of Kant. I present a novel way of understanding the Noumenalist view, which characterises the distinction between appearances and things in themselves as the distinction between referents and truthmakers. I show that, on this interpretation of Kant, the most pressing problems for the Noumenalist reading are primarily based on equivocations between features of reference and features of truthmaking.

摘要

康德的解释者不同意的核心问题之一是他所谓的本体论——声称我们在空间和时间中的经验对象是由非时空实体支撑的，非时空实体导致我们的经验对象的表示。尽管有很多文本证据支持本体论，但非本体论者也对康德的这种解读提出了大量的哲学和释经挑战。我提出了一种理解本体论观点的新方法，它将现象和事物本身之间的区别描述为指称对象和真理制造者之间的区别。我表明，根据对康德的这种解释，