ABSTRACT

Most theorists agree that our social order includes a distinctive legal dimension. A fundamental question is that of whether reference to specific legal phenomena always involves a commitment to a particular moral view. Whereas many philosophers advance the ‘positivist’ claim that any correspondence between morality and the law is just a function of political circumstance, natural law theorists insist that law is intrinsically moral. Each school claims the crucial advantage of consistency with our folk concept. Drawing on the notion of dual character concepts, we develop a set of hypotheses about the intuitive relation between a rule’s moral and legal aspects. We then report a set of studies that conflict unexpectedly with the predictions by legal positivists. Intuitively, an evil rule is not a fully-fledged instance of law.

摘要

大多数理论家都同意，我们的社会秩序包括一个独特的法律维度。一个基本问题是，对特定法律现象的提及是否总是涉及对特定道德观点的承诺。尽管许多哲学家提出了“实证主义者”的主张，即道德与法律之间的任何对应都只是政治环境的一种功能，但自然法理论家坚持认为法律本质上是道德的。每所学校都声称与我们的民间概念保持一致的关键优势。借鉴双重性格概念的概念，我们提出了一套关于规则的道德和法律方面之间的直觉关系的假设。然后，我们报告了一组与法律实证主义者的预测出乎意料地冲突的研究。直觉上，邪恶的规则并不是一个成熟的法律实例。