当前位置: X-MOL 学术Int. Rev. Law Econ. › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
Discovery, disclosure, and confidence
International Review of Law and Economics ( IF 1.216 ) Pub Date : 2021-02-10 , DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2021.105983
Alex McLeod

With the procedural tools of discovery and disclosure available, why would a plaintiff and a defendant fail to both understand the merits of the case and settle it out of court? I analyze a model in which initially the defendant has complete information about the case whereas the plaintiff knows nothing but can learn any fraction of the information, at no cost to himself, through discovery, after which the defendant can disclose any fraction of the remaining information at a constant marginal cost. The plaintiff may underutilize discovery so as to have a chance of privately identifying the defendant's type while still outwardly maintaining his belief that the defendant may have a weak case. For a defendant with a strong case, incomplete discovery can make it excessively costly to signal his strength through a high level of disclosure and excessively risky to signal his strength through a low settlement offer. I show that, in that situation, the availability of discovery actually decreases the probability of settlement.



中文翻译:

发现,披露和信心

有了发现和披露的程序工具,原告和被告为何都无法理解案件的案情并在庭外和解呢?我分析了一个模型,在该模型中,被告最初拥有有关案件的完整信息,而原告一无所知,但可以通过发现而无偿学习任何信息,此后,被告可以披露剩余信息的任何部分以不变的边际成本。原告可能未充分利用发现,因此有机会私下识别被告的类型,同时仍在表面上保持其对被告案件可能较弱的信念。对于有充分理由的被告,不完全的发现可能会导致通过高水平的披露来表明他的力量的成本过高,而通过低价的要约来表明他的力量的风险太大。我表明,在那种情况下,发现的可用性实际上降低了解决的可能性。

更新日期:2021-02-21
down
wechat
bug