An uninformed principal appoints a committee of experts to vote on a multi-attribute alternative, such as an interdisciplinary project. Each expert evaluates one attribute and is biased toward it (specialty bias). The principal values all attributes equally but has a status quo bias, reflecting the organizational cost of a change. We study whether the principal would compose the committee of more or less specialty-biased experts. We show that her optimal composition is nonmonotonic in the majority rule, with the most biased experts appointed under intermediate rules. We then show that the principal would be less concerned about the committee composition if its members can be uninformed, as they induce the informed to vote less strategically. Surprisingly, although uninformed members lower the quality of the committee's decision, the principal may prefer to have some when its composition is suboptimal, and the majority rule is sufficiently extreme, such as the unanimity.

一位不知情的校长任命一个专家委员会对跨学科项目等多属性替代方案进行投票。每位专家都会评估一个属性，并偏向该属性（专业偏见）。主体对所有属性都具有同等价值，但具有现状偏差，反映了变更的组织成本。我们研究了校长是否会组成由或多或少具有专业偏见的专家组成的委员会。我们显示出她的最佳组成在多数规则中是非单调的，在中间规则下任命了最偏见的专家。然后，我们表明，如果委员会成员不知情，则校长将不必担心委员会的组成，因为他们会诱使知情人士减少战略性投票。令人惊讶的是，尽管不知情的成员降低了委员会决定的质量，