This paper analyzes the effects of industrial concentration on bidding behavior and expected revenues. These effects are studied under the CIAPI model, an affiliated value set-up that nests a variety of valuation and information environments. We formally decompose the revenue effects coming from less competition into five types. The properties of these effects are discussed and conditions for (non)monotonicity of both the equilibrium bid and revenue are stated. Our results suggest that it is more likely that the seller benefits from less competition in markets with more complete valuation and information structures.

中文翻译：

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一价拍卖中竞争的影响

本文分析了产业集中度对投标行为和预期收入的影响。这些影响是在CIAPI模型下研究的，CIAPI模型是一种嵌套在各种估值和信息环境中的关联价值设置。我们将来自较少竞争的收入效应正式分解为五种类型。讨论了这些影响的性质，并说明了平衡出价和收入的（非）单调性的条件。我们的结果表明，卖方更有可能受益于市场竞争较少，估值和信息结构更完整的情况。