Abstract

We analyse the political economy of the public provision of private goods when individuals care about their social status. Status concerns motivate richer individuals to vote for the public provision of goods they themselves buy in markets: a higher provision level attracts more individuals to the public sector, enhancing the social exclusivity of market purchases. Majority voting may lead to a public provision that only a minority of citizens use. Users in the public sector may enjoy better provision than users in the private system. We characterise the coalitions that can prevail in a political equilibrium.

中文翻译：

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社会地位问题与公共提供私人物品的政治经济学

摘要

当个人关心自己的社会地位时，我们分析私人提供公共物品的政治经济学。对地位的关注促使富裕的人投票支持他们自己在市场上购买的商品的公共供应：较高的供应水平吸引了更多的个人进入公共部门，从而增强了市场购买的社会排他性。多数投票可能会导致只有少数公民使用的公共条款。公共部门的用户可能比私有系统的用户享受更好的服务。我们描述了在政治平衡中可能占上风的联盟。