ABSTRACT This paper analyses the burden sharing decisions of two Canadian prime ministers, Stephen Harper and Justin Trudeau, regarding the U.S.-led coalition that sought to “degrade and ultimately defeat” the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, primarily through an aerial bombing campaign initiated on 8 August 2014. More specifically, it explains Harper’s decision in October 2014 to contribute six CF-18 fighters to take part in combat operations during this intervention and Trudeau’s decision in February 2016 to recall these aircraft by the end of that month. Many studies of burden sharing focus on static rational incentives to explain long-term trends in a state’s contributions to an alliance or coalition, which suggest that both prime ministers should have made consistent, minimal contribution to the intervention. In contrast, this study argues that the leader of a small, weak state’s decisions about contributing combat resources to coalition military interventions are strongly influenced by the leader’s willingness to adhere to the constraints associated with being a small, weak member of a coalition. Leaders whose personalities encourage them to challenge constraints are less likely, all else being equal, to contribute combat resources to coalition military interventions than leaders whose personalities encourage them to respect constraints.

中文翻译：

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在打击伊拉克和叙利亚伊斯兰国的联合行动中，个性在加拿大负担分担决策中的作用

摘要 本文分析了两位加拿大总理斯蒂芬·哈珀和贾斯汀·特鲁多关于美国领导的联盟的分担决定，该联盟主要通过发起的空中轰炸行动来“削弱并最终击败”伊拉克和叙利亚伊斯兰国。 2014 年 8 月 8 日。更具体地说，它解释了哈珀在 2014 年 10 月决定在这次干预期间派遣 6 架 CF-18 战斗机参与作战行动，以及特鲁多在 2016 年 2 月决定在该月底前召回这些飞机。许多关于负担分担的研究侧重于静态理性激励，以解释一个国家对联盟或联盟的贡献的长期趋势，这表明两位总理都应该对干预做出一致的、最小的贡献。相比之下，本研究认为，弱小国家的领导人关于为联军军事干预贡献战斗资源的决定在很大程度上受到领导人愿意遵守与作为联军弱小成员相关的约束的意愿的影响。在其他条件相同的情况下，个性鼓励他们挑战限制的领导人与个性鼓励他们尊重限制的领导人相比，不太可能为联军军事干预贡献战斗资源。