In 2006 President George W. Bush and his advisers devised a strategy, known as the “surge,” to combat the growing insurgency in Iraq. It is widely credited with reducing violence and stabilizing the country. Although surge troops were removed from Iraq, the narrative of the surge remains a rhetorical resource for defense hawks. This paper examines the uses of that narrative to (re)orient American security policy by analyzing the arguments of Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham from 2007–2015. Re-narrativizing the Iraq war with the surge foregrounded has two rhetorical effects: it reconstitutes the initial quagmire stage of the war as merely a test of American resolve and justifies confining war deliberation to the technical sphere.

中文翻译：

---

使激增动员：从夸格米尔到伊拉克平叛

2006年，美国总统布什（George W. Bush）和他的顾问们制定了一项战略，称为“增兵”，以打击伊拉克日益增长的叛乱。人们普遍认为，它减少了暴力并稳定了国家。尽管从伊拉克撤离了突击部队，但突击部队的叙述仍然是防御鹰派的口头禅资源。本文通过分析2007年至2015年参议员约翰·麦凯恩（John McCain）和林赛·格雷厄姆（Lindsey Graham）的论点，研究了这种叙事对（重新）调整美国安全政策的用途。将激增的伊拉克战争重新叙事有两个修辞效果：它重新构成了战争的最初泥潭，仅是对美国决心的考验，并将战争的审议范围限制在技术领域是合理的。