sociality, agency, enchainment, and entanglement’. These Torres Strait canoe-persons convince McNiven that Tylor was wrong, that animism is not a false belief in which personhood is projected onto objects. It is instead ‘the dynamic, transformative potential of the entire field of relations within which beings of all kinds, more or less person-like or thing-like, continually and reciprocally bring one another into existence’. This is a book which takes non-human agency and relational personhood seriously and recognises humans and other-than-humans as co-equal persons in the world. The papers discuss relational identities and other-than-human agency in a diverse range of archaeological and anthropological contexts. And yet a position which takes indigenous animism seriously, as something of equal stature to western thinking, offers little direct benefit to indigenous communities. Animist thinking may assist in decolonising archaeological thought, but it is not going to decolonise wider society. The editors state that while their contributors have gained from thinking through their material with animism, a ‘critical revision’ is needed to escape the ‘vast ontological divide between “the West and the rest”’, as realism and modernist objective science unhelpfully reject one another’s position. It is in the theorising of the final chapter, by Harrison-Buck, that a solution is put forward in the form of ‘embodied cognition’ as ‘conversely co-creative’ due to the diverse ways in which people engage with ‘their physical world’. Rather than attempt to resolve the mind/body dualism, Harrison-Buck suggests that we ‘invert our logic by considering the relationship of the body in the mind’, or bodily experiences ‘operating inside the embodied mind’, so that ‘thinking and doing are co-creative conditions in the formation of agency, materiality, and personhood’. This is more than just semantics, even if those problematic terms ‘mind’, ‘body’ and ‘physical world’ remain in play. Overall, this book marks an important ‘effort to move the ontological project forward in archaeology’ and will be essential reading for anthropologists, archaeologists and other thoughtful scholars.

中文翻译：

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改变中世纪早期岛屿世界及以后的信仰景观：改变岛屿 II

社会性、能动性、束缚和纠缠”。这些托雷斯海峡独木舟人让麦克尼文相信泰勒是错的，万物有灵论并不是一种将人格投射到物体上的错误信念。相反，它是“整个关系领域的动态的、变革性的潜力，在这个领域中，各种各样的存在，或多或少像人或像物，不断地、互惠地使彼此存在”。这是一本严肃对待非人类能动性和关系人格的书，并承认人类和非人类是世界上平等的人。这些论文讨论了各种考古学和人类学背景下的关系身份和非人类机构。然而，一种将本土万物有灵论视为与西方思想同等地位的立场，对土著社区几乎没有直接好处。万物有灵论思想可能有助于考古学思想的非殖民化，但它不会使更广泛的社会非殖民化。编辑们指出，虽然他们的撰稿人通过以万物有灵论思考他们的材料而有所收获，但需要进行“批判性修订”以逃避“西方与其他人之间的巨大本体论分歧”，因为现实主义和现代主义客观科学无益地拒绝了一个别人的立场。在哈里森-巴克的最后一章的理论化中，由于人们与“他们的物理世界”互动的方式多种多样，因此以“具身认知”的形式提出了一个解决方案，即“反向共同创造” '。与其试图解决身心二元论，哈里森-巴克建议我们“通过考虑身体在头脑中的关系来颠倒我们的逻辑”，或者身体体验“在具身的头脑中运作”，因此“思考和行动是形成能动性的共同创造条件，物质性和人格性”。这不仅仅是语义，即使那些有问题的术语“思想”、“身体”和“物理世界”仍在发挥作用。总的来说，这本书标志着“推动考古学本体论项目向前发展的重要努力”，将成为人类学家、考古学家和其他有思想的学者的必读之物。“身体”和“物理世界”仍在发挥作用。总的来说，这本书标志着“推动考古学本体论项目向前发展的重要努力”，将成为人类学家、考古学家和其他有思想的学者的必读之物。“身体”和“物理世界”仍在发挥作用。总的来说，这本书标志着“推动考古学本体论项目向前发展的重要努力”，将成为人类学家、考古学家和其他有思想的学者的必读之物。