ABSTRACT

One challenge in providing an adequate definition of physical disability is that of unifying the heterogeneous bodily conditions that count as disabilities. We examine recent proposals by Elizabeth Barnes [2016], and Dana Howard and Sean Aas [2018], and show how this debate has reached an impasse. Barnes’s account struggles to deliver principled unification of the category of disability, whilst Howard and Aas’s account risks inappropriately sidelining the body. We argue that this impasse can be broken by using a novel concept—marginalised functioning. Marginalised functioning concerns the relationship between a person’s bodily capacities and their social world—specifically, their ability to function in line with the default norms about how people can typically physically function that influence the structuring of social space. We argue that attending to marginalised functioning allows us to develop, not one, but three different models of disability, all of which—whilst having different strengths and weaknesses—unify the category of disability without sidelining the body.

摘要

为身体残疾提供充分定义的一个挑战是统一被视为残疾的异质身体状况。我们研究了 Elizabeth Barnes [2016]、Dana Howard 和 Sean Aas [2018] 最近的提案，并展示了这场辩论如何陷入僵局。巴恩斯的叙述努力实现残疾类别的原则统一，而霍华德和阿斯的叙述则冒着不恰当地将身体排除在外的风险。我们认为可以通过使用一个新概念——边缘化功能来打破这种僵局。边缘化功能涉及一个人的身体能力与其社会世界之间的关系——特别是，他们按照默认规范运作的能力，即人们通常如何影响社会空间结构的身体功能。我们认为，关注边缘化的功能使我们能够发展出，而不是一种，而是三种不同的残疾模式，所有这些模式——虽然具有不同的优势和劣势——统一了残疾类别，而不会使身体处于边缘。