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Infinite Magnitudes, Infinite Multitudes, and the Beginning of the Universe
Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-08-24 , DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2020.1795696
Mohammad Saleh Zarepour 1
Affiliation  

ABSTRACT

W.L. Craig has argued that the universe has a beginning because (1) the infinitude of the past entails the existence of actual infinite multitudes of past intervals of time, and (2) the existence of actual infinite multitudes is impossible. Puryear has rejected (1) and argued that what the infinitude of the past entails is only the existence of an actual infinite magnitude of past time. But this does not preclude the infinitude of the past, Puryear claims, because there can be no justification for the claim that actual infinite magnitudes are impossible. I argue, against Puryear, that there can be such a justification. I claim, nevertheless, that, for reasons entirely different from Puryear’s, the finitude of the past cannot be established based either on the impossibility of actual infinite multitudes or on the impossibility of actual infinite magnitudes. My arguments in this paper draw on insights from al-Kindī and Avicenna.



中文翻译:

无限量级、无限量和宇宙的开始

摘要

WL Craig 认为宇宙有一个开端,因为 (1) 过去的无限意味着过去时间间隔的实际无限多的存在,以及 (2) 实际无限多的存在是不可能的。Puryear 拒绝了 (1) 并认为过去的无限性所包含的只是过去时间的实际无限量级的存在。但这并不排除过去的无限性,Puryear 声称,因为没有任何理由可以证明实际的无限量级是不可能的。我反对 Puryear,认为可以有这样的理由。尽管如此,我声称,出于与普耶尔完全不同的原因,过去的有限性既不能基于实际无限多的不可能性,也不能基于实际无限量的不可能性。我在本文中的论点借鉴了 al-Kindī 和 Avicenna 的见解。

更新日期:2020-08-24
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