ABSTRACT

Some epistemologists hold that all rational norms are fundamentally concerned with the agent’s states or attitudes at an individual time [Hedden 2015 Hedden, B. 2015. Time-Slice Rationality, Mind 124/494: 449–91. doi: 10.1093/mind/fzu181[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2016; Moss 2015 Moss, S. 2015. Time-Slice Epistemology and Action Under Indeterminacy, in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, vol. 5, ed. Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 172–94.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]]; others argue that all rational norms are fundamentally concerned with processes [Podgorski 2017 Podgorski, A. 2017. Rational Delay, Philosophers’ Imprint 17/5: 1–19.[Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]]. This distinction is not drawn in discussions of emotional rationality. As a result, a widely held assumption in the literature on emotional rationality has gone unexamined. I employ Abelard Podgorski’s argument from rational delay to argue that many emotional norms are fundamentally concerned with emotional processes. I also claim that the main response available to the synchronist about belief is not available to the synchronist about emotions and, therefore, fundamental process norms are more plausible than epistemologists tend to believe.

摘要

一些认识论者认为，所有理性规范从根本上都关注个体在某个时间的状态或态度[Hedden 2015 海登，B. 2015 年。时间片理性，心灵124/494：449 – 91。doi: 10.1093/mind/fzu181 [Crossref], [Web of Science®]  , [Google Scholar] , 2016; 苔藓2015 莫斯，S. 2015 年。时间片认识论和不确定性下的行动，在牛津认识论研究，第一卷。5，编辑。Tamar Szabó Gendler和John Hawthorne，牛津：牛津大学出版社：172 – 94。[交叉引用]  ，[谷歌学术] ]；其他人则认为所有理性规范从根本上都与过程有关[Podgorski 2017 波德戈尔斯基，A. 2017 年。理性延迟，哲学家的 印记17/5：1 – 19。[科学网®]  、[谷歌学术] ]。这种区别在情感理性的讨论中没有得出。结果，关于情感理性的文献中广泛持有的假设没有得到检验。我采用 Abelard Podgorski 的理性延迟论点来论证许多情绪规范从根本上与情绪过程有关. 我还声称同步论者对信念的主要反应对同步论者来说是不可用的，因此，基本过程规范比认识论者倾向于相信的更合理。