ABSTRACT

The president's ability to legislate is a central element in studies of presidential regimes. A debate persists about the existence of ‘two presidencies’, that is, whether presidential legislative proposals are more successful in Congress when the subject is foreign policy compared to domestic politics. The article makes an empirical contribution in confirming the thesis of the two presidents in a case whose legislative powers of the president are the lowest in the region: Paraguay. Statistical analysis also reveals the importance of political and economic variables in the propensity to approve matters in the Paraguayan legislature, such as presidential popularity, unemployment and the effective number of parties. While the National Congress constrains the legislative production of the Paraguayan president in domestic issues, the president's foreign policy receives high support from legislators. The different characteristics of foreign policy stimulate congressional delegation of the matter to the president.

摘要

总统立法能力是研究总统制度的核心要素。关于“两个总统”的存在的争论持续存在，即与国内政治相比，当主题是外交政策时，总统立法提案在国会中是否更成功。文章在一个总统立法权在该地区最低的案例中为证实两位总统的论点做出了实证贡献：巴拉圭。统计分析还揭示了政治和经济变量在巴拉圭立法机构批准事项的倾向中的重要性，例如总统受欢迎程度、失业和有效政党数量。虽然国民议会限制巴拉圭总统在国内问题上的立法生产，但总统的“ 外交政策得到立法者的高度支持。外交政策的不同特点促使国会将此事委托给总统。