Abstract

This paper evaluates the interaction, which developed during the 1960s and early 1970s, between U.S. and British policies towards the Federal Republic of Germany’s (FRG) Neue Ostpolitik and the impact that West German initiatives had on the special relationship in the context of deepening Anglo-American discrepancies over Vietnam and the UK’s East of Suez withdrawal. In the early 1950s the FRG’s integration into NATO had been a joint Anglo-American priority but the U.S. attitude on how to deal with Soviet concerns about Germany was regarded in London as too rigid. Both Conservative and Labour governments long advocated more flexibility in dealing with the East. However, Whitehall’s attempts to foster dialogue with Moscow, such as Winston Churchill’s 1953 Eastern Locarno proposal for great power guarantees of peace and the status quo in Europe, were resisted by U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John F. Dulles. It was only in the early 1960s that the White House and the State Department gradually reversed the American view that détente would not be possible without progress on the German question. Building upon the legacy of President Kennedy’s 1963 ‘strategy of peace’ speech, between 1964 and 1968 Johnson’s policy of ‘bridge-building’ replaced the static notion of ‘peaceful coexistence’ with a broader vision of progressive engagement. Now Washington took a more flexible approach and encouraged the FRG to open up its own channels towards the Soviet bloc countries. The change in the American attitude was important also for U.S.-UK relations, as it brought it more into line with Britain’s views at a time when, as American involvement in Vietnam grew deeper, Washington exerted significant economic and political pressure on London to retain its East of Suez commitments. However, for the Americans it was equally important that the FRG’s overtures to the Soviet bloc states did not endanger Western cohesion and transatlantic unity. After Nixon’s victory in the 1968 Presidential election, the White House began to worry about the implications of some of the FRG’s initiatives. U.S. apprehensions were now partly shared in London, although new conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath, like Wilson, continued to pursue cooperation with the FRG, seeking to ease the UK’s admission into the European Economic Community (EEC).

摘要

本文评估了1960年代和1970年代初期美国和英国对德意志联邦共和国（FRG）Neue Ostpolitik的政策之间的互动关系。以及英美在越南和英国苏伊士撤军的东部地区之间的分歧不断加深的背景下，西德的举措对特殊关系产生了影响。1950年代初期，FRG融入北约一直是英美共同的优先任务，但在伦敦，美国对如何处理苏联对德国的担忧的态度过于僵化。保守党和工党政府长期以来都主张在与东方打交道时要有更大的灵活性。但是，怀特霍尔试图与莫斯科进行对话的尝试，例如温斯顿·丘吉尔（Winston Churchill）1953年提出的“东方洛迦诺”倡议，要求大国保证和平与现状。在欧洲，遭到美国总统艾森豪威尔（Dwight D. Eisenhower）及其国务卿杜勒斯（John F. Dulles）的抵制。直到1960年代初，白宫和国务院才逐渐扭转了美国的观点，即在德国问题上没有进展就不可能实现缓和。在肯尼迪总统1963年发表的“和平战略”演讲的遗产的基础上，1964年至1968年之间，约翰逊的“桥梁建设”政策以更广泛的渐进式参与视野取代了“和平共处”的静态观念。现在，华盛顿采取了更加灵活的方法，并鼓励FRG开辟自己的通往苏联集团国家的渠道。美国态度的变化对于美英关系也很重要，因为在当时，随着美国对越南的参与进一步加深，华盛顿对伦敦施加了重大的经济和政治压力，以维持其对苏伊士的承诺。但是，对于美国人而言，同样重要的是，FRG向苏联集团国家提出的提议不应危及西方的凝聚力和跨大西洋的团结。尼克松在1968年总统大选中获胜后，白宫开始担心某些FRG举措的影响。美国的忧虑现在在伦敦已经部分地得到了分享，尽管新的保守派首相爱德华·希思（Edward Heath）和威尔逊一样继续寻求与FRG合作，以寻求缓解英国对欧洲经济共同体（EEC）的接纳。对于美国人而言，同样重要的是，FRG向苏联集团国家提出的提议不应危及西方的凝聚力和跨大西洋的团结。尼克松在1968年总统大选中获胜后，白宫开始担心某些FRG举措的影响。美国的忧虑现在在伦敦已经部分地得到了分享，尽管新的保守派首相爱德华·希思（Edward Heath）和威尔逊一样继续寻求与FRG合作，以寻求缓解英国对欧洲经济共同体（EEC）的接纳。对于美国人而言，同样重要的是，FRG向苏联集团国家提出的提议不应危及西方的凝聚力和跨大西洋的团结。尼克松在1968年总统大选中获胜后，白宫开始担心某些FRG举措的影响。美国的忧虑现在在伦敦已经部分地得到了分享，尽管新的保守派首相爱德华·希思（Edward Heath）和威尔逊一样继续寻求与FRG合作，以寻求缓解英国对欧洲经济共同体（EEC）的接纳。