remained fundamental later in the war. According to Marvel, this was the primary motivation for veterans to reenlist in 1863, and it also explains the influx of 1864 recruits, who were either too young, too old, or otherwise unsuitable for the field. Military service could, alternatively, be a boon, have little effect, or worsen the financial lot of Union soldiers. Marvel contends that “hundreds of thousands ... had entered the army without skills, had learned nothing useful during their service, and faced an increasingly demanding job market” (226). He observes that many veterans pursued the awarding of a pension because of their impoverishment. Ultimately, he notes that the participants’ ideological statements should be regarded as suspect given the general contempt, in the period, for admissions of economic incentive. In the postwar context, veterans were reluctant to discuss the role of money in their decision to serve, since the surging bounties that had once enticed men now appeared to be greed that tarnished the system. Lincoln’s Mercenaries is fluidly written and convincing. It should appeal to academics and enthusiasts alike. Some may bristle at the book’s title, but in Marvel’s view, the term “mercenaries” aptly describes men who could earn more cash as Federals than they could otherwise. He encourages a reappraisal of the Civil War soldier, situating the Union Army within American military history, observing that material inducements were likewise critical for the Continental Army in the War of Independence and remain so in the all-volunteer force of today. The author’s research introduces several promising avenues that merit further exploration. He notes that financially driven men sometimes lacked the will to fight, offering the prospect of studying whether the profit motive impacted combat performance. This inquiry could be extended to determine whether that factor also bore upon a soldier’s conduct between battles. In 1984, historian John A. Lynn theorized the existence of three types of motivation: initial, combat, and sustaining. Marvel has written persuasively that economics had a major influence on the first type, and it remains for scholars to apply this line of inquiry to the others.

中文翻译：

---

这场战争还没有结束：在美国新政中与南北战争作斗争。尼娜·希尔伯（NinaSilber）。（北卡罗来纳州教堂山，北卡罗来纳大学出版社，2018年，第十二页，232.32.95美元。）

在战争后期仍然是基本的。根据Marvel的说法，这是退伍军人在1863年重新入伍的主要动机，这也解释了1864名新兵的涌入，这些新兵要么太年轻，太老，要么不适合该领域。或者，服兵役可能会带来好处，收效甚微，或使联盟士兵的财政状况恶化。漫威认为，“成千上万……没有技能就参军，服役期间没有学到任何有用的东西，面临着日益苛刻的就业市场”（226）。他指出，许多退伍军人由于贫困而要求发放退休金。最终，他指出，鉴于在此期间人们普遍鄙视接受经济激励措施，参与者的意识形态陈述应被视为可疑。在战后时期，退伍军人不愿讨论金钱在他们任职的决定中的作用，因为曾经诱使人们大涨的赏金现在看来已经使该制度受损了。林肯的《雇佣兵》写得流畅而令人信服。它应该吸引学者和爱好者。有些人可能对这本书的标题感到不满，但在Marvel看来，“雇佣军”一词恰如其分地描述了那些可以赚得比联邦人更多的现金的人。他鼓励对内战士兵进行重新评估，将联合军置于美国军事历史之内，并观察到物质诱动对独立战争中的大陆军同样至关重要，并且在当今的全志愿部队中依然如此。作者的研究介绍了一些值得进一步探索的有前途的途径。他指出，受财务驱动的人员有时缺乏战斗意愿，这为研究利润动机是否影响战斗表现提供了前景。可以扩展此查询以确定该因素是否也影响士兵在两次战斗之间的行为。1984年，历史学家约翰·林恩（John A. Lynn）对三种动机的存在进行了理论化：最初动机，战斗动机和维持动机。漫威有说服力地写道，经济学对第一类产生了重大影响，学者们仍然可以将这一探究方法应用于其他方面。林恩对三种动机的存在进行了理论化：初始动机，战斗动机和维持动机。漫威有说服力地写道，经济学对第一类产生了重大影响，学者们仍然可以将这一探究方法应用于其他方面。林恩对三种动机的存在进行了理论化：初始动机，战斗动机和维持动机。漫威有说服力地写道，经济学对第一类产生了重大影响，学者们仍然可以将这一探究方法应用于其他方面。