ABSTRACT This essay argues that the philosophy of the Mengzi is not an idealism or naturalism which makes morality something innate. These interpretations are limited by Cartesian presuppositions of objectivity and subjectivity, which were not a part of the Mengzi’s philosophical repertoire. This essay rehearses the problem of subjectivity and objectivity in Western philosophy. It then argues that no such dichotomy informed the Mengzi; instead, it maintains that minds and their worlds are mutually entailing and constituting. It explores the relationship between the concepts of heart-mind, human nature, and tian, arguing that heart-mind is the emergence of human nature which is the internalized interpretive framework of an external Confucian morality referred to as tian. It argues that humans are situated within historical traditions that provide their world horizons. There is no world beyond the Confucian world and no mind beyond the Confucian mind: the Mengzi is a realism with a Confucian face.

中文翻译：

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论孟子的主观性和客观性

摘要本文认为，孟子的哲学不是使道德与生俱来的理想主义或自然主义。这些解释受到客观性和主观性的笛卡尔前提的限制，这不是孟子哲学著作的一部分。本文探讨了西方哲学的主观性和客观性问题。然后，它认为没有这样的二分法告知孟子。取而代之的是，它认为思想及其世界相互影响和构成。它探讨了心灵，人性和天性之间的关系，认为心灵是人性的出现，这是儒家外在道德被称为天性的内在解释框架。它认为人类处在提供其世界视野的历史传统中。儒家世界之外没有其他世界，儒家思维之外没有任何思想：孟子是一种具有儒家面子的现实主义。