Abstract The literature on epistemic injustice has been helpful for highlighting some of the epistemic harms that have long troubled those working in area studies that concern oppressed populations. Nonetheless, a good deal of this literature is oriented toward those in a position to perpetrate injustices, rather than those who historically have been harmed by them. This orientation, I argue, is ill-suited to the work of epistemic decolonization. In this essay, I call and hold attention to the epistemic interests of those who are epistemically marginalized on account of relations of dominance and oppression. To do so, I draw on Kristie Dotson’s work, which uses a systems approach focused on epistemic agency. I develop Dotson’s insights further to argue that epistemic inclusions may be just as pernicious as epistemic exclusions Specifically, I highlight some of the ways in which epistemic agents can be included in epistemic systems in a manner that is epistemically exploitative—extracting epistemic labor coercively or in ways that are distinctly non-reciprocal. I then turn to María Lugones’ distinction between horizontal and vertical practices to discuss avenues of resisting both exclusions and inclusions that thwart the epistemic agency of marginalized knowers.

中文翻译：

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被压迫的认识机构

摘要认识论不公正的文献有助于突出一些认识论的危害，这些危害长期困扰着从事与受压迫人群有关的区域研究的人们。但是，这些文献中有很多是针对那些有可能造成不公正待遇的人，而不是那些历来受到不公正待遇的人。我认为，这种取向不适合认知非殖民化的工作。在本文中，我呼吁并关注那些由于统治和压迫关系而被认识论边缘化的人的认识利益。为此，我借鉴了克里斯蒂·多森（Kristie Dotson）的工作，该工作使用了一种系统的方法来关注认知代理。我将进一步发展Dotson的见解，以指出认知内含物可能与认知内含物一样有害。我着重介绍了可以以认识论剥削的方式将认识论因素包含在认识论系统中的一些方法，即以强制性方式提取认识论劳动或以明显地非对等方式提取认识劳动。然后，我将讨论玛丽亚·卢贡涅斯（MaríaLugones）在横向实践和纵向实践之间的区别，以讨论抵制排斥和包容性的途径，这些途径阻碍了边缘化知识者的认知机构。