Abstract A central point of contention in the ongoing debate between Humean and anti-Humean accounts of moral motivation concerns the theoretical credentials of the idea of mental states that are cognitive and motivational at the same time. Humeans claim that this idea is incoherent and thereby unintelligible (M. Smith, The Moral Problem, Blackwell 1994). I start by developing a linguistic argument against this claim. The semantics of certain ‘learning to’ and ‘knowing to’ ascriptions points to a dispositional state that has both motivational and cognitive properties: habitual knowledge, as we may call it. But there is nothing unintelligible or incoherent about such ascriptions as they figure in the explanation and assessment of action. This suggests that the idea of a state that has both cognitive and motivational properties is not an artefact of philosophical speculation. Moreover, I suggest that action explanations that appeal to habitual knowledge, which are a variety of habit explanation, present distinctive problems for Humean accounts. The discussion bears on the relationship between habitual knowledge and knowing-how, and its possible significance for anti-Humean accounts of moral motivation.

中文翻译：

---

学习，后天性格与谦卑动机理论

摘要休Hum与反休ume关于道德动机的争论正在进行的争论的中心点是关于同时具有认知和动机的精神状态的理论依据。Humeans声称这个想法是不连贯的，因此难以理解（M. Smith，《道德问题》，布莱克韦尔，1994年）。我首先针对这种说法提出一种语言学论证。某些“学习”和“知道”归属的语义指向具有动机和认知特性的性格状态：习惯性知识，我们可以称之为“习惯性知识”。但是，正如在解释和评估行动中所指出的那样，这些名称并没有任何不可理解或不连贯的地方。这表明，具有认知和动机属性的国家的思想不是哲学推测的产物。此外，我建议吸引习惯知识的行动解释是各种习惯解释，这些解释对Humean帐户提出了独特的问题。讨论涉及习惯性知识与专有技术之间的关系，及其对反休ume式道德动机解释的可能意义。