Abstract Why should we decolonise knowledge? One popular rationale is that colonialism has set up a single perspective as epistemically authoritative over many equally legitimate ones, and this is a form of epistemic injustice. Hence, we should take different epistemic perspectives as having equal epistemic authority. A problem with this rationale is that its relativist implications undermine the call for decolonisation, which is premised on the objectivity of the moral claim that ‘epistemic colonisation is wrong’. In this paper, I aim to provide a rationale for epistemic decolonisation that avoids the shortfalls of this relativist rationale. I develop a distinctly epistemic rationale for epistemic decolonisation that positions the imperative to decolonise knowledge as an epistemic virtue.

中文翻译：

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走向认知非殖民化的合理解释

摘要为什么要对知识进行非殖民化？一个普遍的理由是，殖民主义在许多同等合法的观点上建立了具有认识论权威的单一观点，这是认识论不公正的一种形式。因此，我们应该采用不同的认识论观点，认为它们具有相等的认识论权威。这个理由的一个问题是，它的相对主义含义破坏了非殖民化的呼声，这是基于道德主张“客观殖民化是错误的”的客观性的前提。在本文中，我旨在为认知非殖民化提供一个理论基础，避免这种相对论基础的不足。我为认知非殖民化发展了明显的认知原理，将非殖民化知识的必要性定位为认知美德。