Abstract This article considers the question ‘What makes hope rational?’ We take Adrienne Martin's recent incorporation analysis of hope as representative of a tradition that views the rationality of hope as a matter of instrumental reasons. Against this tradition, we argue that an important subset of hope, ‘fundamental hope’, is not governed by instrumental rationality. Rather, people have reason to endorse or reject such hope in virtue of the contribution of the relevant attitudes to the integrity of their practical identity, which makes the relevant hope not instrumentally but intrinsically valuable. This argument also allows for a new analysis of the reasons people have to abandon hope and for a better understanding of non-fundamental, ‘prosaic’ hopes.

中文翻译：

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基本希望与实践身份

摘要本文考虑了“什么使希望变得合理？”这一问题。我们以Adrienne Martin最近对希望的纳入分析为代表的传统的代表，该传统将希望的合理性视为工具性原因。与这一传统相反，我们认为希望的重要子集“基本希望”不受工具理性的支配。相反，由于相关态度对他们的实际身份的完整性的贡献，人们有理由认可或拒绝这种希望，这使得相关的希望不是工具性的，而是内在的价值。这一论点还可以对人们放弃希望的原因进行新的分析，并更好地理解非基本的，“平淡的”希望。