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Murdoch, Moral Concepts, and the Universalizability of Moral Reasons
Philosophical Papers Pub Date : 2017-05-04 , DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2017.1318036
Mark Hopwood 1
Affiliation  

Abstract It is widely held that moral reasons are universalizable. On this view, when I give a moral reason for my action, I take this reason to apply with equal normative force to anyone placed in a relevantly similar situation. Here, I offer an interpretation and defense of Iris Murdoch's critique of the universalizability thesis, distinguishing her position from the contemporary versions of particularism with which she has often been mistakenly associated. Murdoch's argument relies upon the idea that moral concepts may take on idiosyncratic meanings that are unique to a particular individual. Consequently, an agent may conceptualize her situation in such a way that it would not make sense to imagine anyone else facing it. For such an agent, it would be meaningless to say that she took her reasons to apply to anyone other than herself. I defend Murdoch’s argument through an extended analysis of a literary example, and consider and reject four possible lines of objection. Finally, I consider the consequences of the argument for our understanding of the nature of moral reasoning and what Murdoch describes as the ‘endless task’ of love.

中文翻译:

默多克,道德观念和道德理性的普遍性

摘要人们普遍认为道德原因是普遍的。根据这种观点,当我给出自己采取行动的道义理由时,我便会以同样的规范性力量适用于处于类似情况的任何人。在这里,我对艾里斯·默多克(Iris Murdoch)对普遍性论点的批评进行了解释和辩护,将她的立场与经常被错误地联系到的当代主义特别主义相区别。默多克的论点依赖于这样的观念,即道德观念可能具有特定个体特有的特质含义。因此,代理人可能会以这样的方式概念化她的处境,即想象没有其他人面对它。对于这样的代理人来说,说她有理由申请除她以外的任何人都是毫无意义的。我通过对文学实例的扩展分析来捍卫默多克的论点,并考虑并拒绝四种可能的反对路线。最后,我认为该论证对我们理解道德推理的本质以及默多克形容为爱的“无尽任务”的后果。
更新日期:2017-05-04
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