Abstract Credal reductivism is the view that outright belief is reducible to degrees of confidence or ‘credence’. The most popular versions of credal reductivism all have the consequence that if you are near-maximally confident that p in a low-stakes situation, then you outright believe p. This paper addresses a recent objection to this consequence—the Correctness Objection— introduced by Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath and further developed by Jacob Ross and Mark Schroeder. The objection is that near-maximal confidence cannot entail outright belief because when you believe a false proposition, you are wrong or incorrect, whereas you can be highly confident of a false proposition in a low-stakes situation without being incorrect (provided, at least, that you’re not absolutely certain). Both Fantl and McGrath’s and Ross and Schoeder’s versions of the Correctness Objection admit of multiple interpretations. But it is argued that even on the most charitable interpretations the objection fails.

中文翻译：

---

诚信与正确：捍卫克雷德·还原主义

摘要克雷达尔还原主义是一种认为完全信仰可以还原为置信度或“信任度”的观点。credal还原主义的最流行版本都具有以下结果：如果您对低风险情况下的p具有最大的信心，那么您就完全相信p。本文针对由杰里米·范特尔（Jeremy Fantl）和马修·麦格拉思（Matthew McGrath）提出并由雅各布·罗斯（Jacob Ross）和马克·施罗德（Mark Schroeder）进一步提出的对这种后果的最新异议-正确性异议。反对意见是，近乎最大的置信度不能完全相信，因为当您相信一个错误的主张时，您是错的或不正确的，而在低风险的情况下您可以高度确信一个错误的主张而不会被错误的（至少，前提是，即表示您不确定）。Fantl和McGrath以及Ross和Schoeder的“正确性异议”版本都承认多种解释。但是有人认为，即使是在最慈善的解释上，反对也失败了。