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Global Public Reason, Diversity, and Consent
Philosophical Papers Pub Date : 2019-01-02 , DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2019.1584541
Samuel Director 1
Affiliation  

Abstract In this paper, I examine global public reason as a method of justifying a global state. Ultimately, I conclude that global public reason fails to justify a global state. This is the case, because global public reason faces an unwinnable dilemma. The global public reason theorist must endorse either a hypothetical theory of consent or an actual theory of consent; if she endorses a theory of hypothetical consent, then she fails to justify her principles; and if she endorses a theory of actual consent, her theory will lead to a highly unstable political system. On either side of the dilemma, global public reason faces untenable implications. Although similar criticisms have been advanced against domestic public reason, my argument is not repeating points made before me. My argument is new, in that it raises these objections specifically against global public reason, and in that it shows how, due to increased diversity of belief in the global arena, these problems are more pressing for global public reason than they are for domestic public reason.

中文翻译:

全球公共理性,多样性和同意

摘要在本文中,我研究了全球公共理性作为证明全球状态合理性的一种方法。最终,我得出结论,全球公共理性无法为全球国家辩护。之所以如此,是因为全球公共理性面临不可挽回的困境。全球公共理性理论家必须认可假设的同意理论或实际的同意理论;如果她赞同假设同意的理论,那么她就无法为自己的原则辩护;如果她赞同实际同意的理论,那么她的理论将导致高度不稳定的政治制度。在两难困境的任何一方,全球公共理性都面临着难以为继的影响。尽管针对国内公共理性提出了类似的批评,但我的论点并没有重复我面前提出的观点。我的观点是新的,
更新日期:2019-01-02
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