Abstract The contemporary standard view of phenomenal consciousness (PC)—shared by reductionists and non-reductionists alike—takes it to be a simple, ‘low-level’, ‘pre-reflective’ feature of mental states, yet at the same time attributes to it both a qualitative and a subjective character (or a phenomenal content and an aspect of subjective awareness). I argue that these two allegedly constitutive elements of PC do not go together as harmoniously as is usually assumed. The standard view introduces a complexity into the notion of PC which gives rise to problems of the sort traditionally associated with higher-order views (i.e., regress and redundancy problems). Finding the tension more or less inescapable, and rejecting a simplistic view like Dainton’s, which dispenses altogether with subjective awareness—and arguing that there is a special problem with accounting for the particularity of conscious states—I explore some speculative suggestions as to how subjective awareness could be understood as a distinctive factor that cannot be assimilated to phenomenal content, while maintaining that the two elements are intimately related.

中文翻译：

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现象意识的本质张力

摘要还原论者和非还原论者共有的现象意识（PC）的当代标准观点将其视为精神状态的一种简单的，“低级的”，“预反思的”特征，但同时具有属性它既具有定性特征又具有主观特征（或非凡的内容和主观意识的一个方面）。我认为，PC的这两个所谓的构成要素并没有像通常认为的那样和谐地组合在一起。标准视图将复杂性引入了PC概念，从而引起了传统上与高阶视图相关联的问题（即回归和冗余问题）。找到或多或少不可避免的张力，并拒绝像丹顿的观点那样简单的观点，