As a typical subject, you experience a variety of paradigmatically temporal phenomena. Looking out of the window in the English summer, you can see leaves swaying in the breeze and hear the pitter-patter of raindrops steadily increasing against the window. In discussions of temporal experience, and through reflecting on examples such as those offered, two phenomenological claims are widely – though not unequivocally – accepted: firstly, you perceptually experience motion and change; secondly, while more than a momentary state of affairs is presented in your ongoing perceptual experience, that which is presented nonetheless seems to be of a quite limited temporal extent. These two claims are frequently tied to the notion of the specious present. However, there has recently been a push back against the supposed link between perceived motion and the specious present. I argue that there are two ways of understanding this link, and while one has recently been the target of criticism, the other withstands such criticism. My overarching aim is to clarify the notion of the specious present through a discussion of the notion’s origins, in addition to recent criticism directed at the notion, with the hope of reframing how contemporary debates proceed.

中文翻译：

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两个威廉姆斯的故事：詹姆斯，斯特恩和似是而非的礼物

作为典型的主题，您会遇到各种各样的范式时间现象。在英国夏季，从窗户往外看，您可以看到树叶在微风中摇曳，听到窗外雨滴的the沥沥地不断增加。在对时间经验的讨论中，并通过反思所提供的例子，两个现象学的主张被广泛地接受，尽管不是毫不含糊地被接受：首先，您在感知上体验到运动和变化。其次，虽然在您持续的感性体验中不仅呈现了暂时的状态，但是呈现的状态似乎在时间上是非常有限的。这两个主张经常与似是而非的概念联系在一起。然而，最近，人们开始反对将感知到的运动与虚假的存在联系起来。我认为，有两种理解这种联系的方式，一种虽然最近已成为批评的对象，但另一种可以承受这种批评。我的总体目标是，除了最近针对该概念的起源的批评外，还通过讨论该概念的起源来阐明该概念的概念，以期重新定义当代辩论的进行方式。