Gendler [2007. “Self-deception as Pretense.” Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1): 231–258] offers an account of self-deception in terms of imaginative pretense, according to which the self-deceptive state is a pretense rather than a doxastic attitude. The self-deceived agent who deceives herself about p merely pretends that p is true. In this paper, I aim, first, to show why Gendler’s pretense view requires revision, and second, to offer an alternative account of pretense’s role in self-deception which draws on Gendler’s insight but avoids her problematic anti-doxastic conclusion. I highlight how this view may help to further our doxastic understanding of self-deception. Self-deception should be understood as a diachronic and dynamic process. It often starts with pretense, though it always ends with an inappropriate doxastic attitude, provided that the agent succeeds in deceiving herself. Finally, I discuss some implications of this view in the wider debates concerning the nature of self-knowledge and the ethics of pretense.

中文翻译：

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伪装在自欺欺人过程中的作用

根德勒[2007。“自欺欺人。” 哲学观点21（1）：231–258]从想象中的假装出发，对自我欺骗进行了说明，根据这种假装，自我欺骗的状态是假装，而不是一种自欺欺人的态度。对p欺骗自己的自我欺骗的代理人只会假装p是真实的。在本文中，我的目的是首先显示出为何要修改Gendler的假装观点，其次要提供关于假装在自欺欺人中作用的另一种解释，该假装借鉴了Gendler的见解，但却避免了她提出的令人反感的结论。我着重强调这种观点如何有助于进一步加深我们对自欺欺人的理解。自我欺骗应该被理解为历时和动态的过程。它通常以假装开始，尽管总是以不适当的过分态度结束，前提是代理成功欺骗自己。最后，我在关于自我知识的本质和假装伦理的广泛辩论中讨论了这种观点的某些含义。