Constitutivists have tried to answer Enoch’s “schmagency” objection by arguing that Enoch fails to appreciate the inescapability of agency. Although these arguments are effective against some versions of the objection, I argue that they leave constitutivism vulnerable to an important worry; namely, that constitutivism leaves us alienated from the moral norms that it claims we must follow. In the first part of the paper, I try to make this vague concern more precise: in a nutshell, it seems that constitutivism cannot provide an adequate account of the relation between the constitutive norms of agency and the particular ends the agent pursues. I then provide a broad outline of an interpretation of Kant’s formalism that is immune to this objection. I conclude that constitutivism is best understood as the upshot of a formalist view of categorical practical principles.

中文翻译：

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康德实践哲学中的形式主义和本构主义

宪法主义者试图通过论证以诺未能理解代理的无能为力来回答以诺的“精神分裂”异议。尽管这些论点可以有效地反对某些反对意见，但我认为，它们使宪政主义容易受到重大担忧的困扰。也就是说，本构主义使我们脱离了它声称必须遵循的道德规范。在本文的第一部分中，我试图使这种模糊的关注更加精确：简而言之，似乎构成主义不能充分说明代理人的构成规范与代理人追求的特定目的之间的关系。然后，我提供了对康德形式主义的解释的宽泛概述，这种解释不受这种反对。