According to Pessimism about moral testimony, it is objectionable to form moral beliefs by deferring to another. This paper motivates Pessimism about another source of moral knowledge: propositional memory. Drawing on a discussion of Gilbert Ryle’s on forgetting the difference between right and wrong, it argues that Internalism about moral motivation offers a satisfying explanation of Pessimism about memory. A central claim of the paper is that Pessimism about memory (and by extension, testimony) is an issue in moral psychology rather than moral epistemology. That is because it is best explained by appeal to claims about the constitution of moral knowledge as a state of mind, rather than requirements on belief formation. The paper also provides reason to suspect that the focus on testimony is something of a red herring.

中文翻译：

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记住什么是对的

根据对道德证言的悲观主义，通过屈从于他人来形成道德信仰是令人反感的。本文激发了悲观主义对道德知识的另一种来源的认识：命题记忆。在讨论吉尔伯特·赖尔关于忘记对与错之间区别的讨论时，它认为关于道德动机的内在主义为对记忆的悲观主义提供了令人满意的解释。该论文的主要主张是，对记忆的悲观主义（进而扩展为证词）是道德心理学而不是道德认识论的问题。这是因为，最好是通过诉诸关于道德知识构成为一种心态的主张，而不是对信仰形成的要求来解释。该论文还提供了理由，使人们怀疑对证言的关注是一种红鲱鱼。