Anna Beck’s paper is a welcome addition to the growing literature on assemblage theory in archaeology. It represents a detailed attempt to think through the implications of this approach for one of the most important areas of archaeological thought: typology. Building on the work of Chris Fowler (2017) and Gavin Lucas (2012) in particular, archaeologists are beginning to show the potential for linking cutting-edge theory with this most intransigent of archaeological concepts. Beck correctly skewers the way in which standard typological thinking rests upon the notion of an ‘ideal type’, the perfect Trelleborg house in her case, and how this representational, Platonic, mode of thinking, traps archaeologists in a limited and closed interpretive loop. As she rightly argues, a move to assemblage theory can help us make room for more complex and powerful descriptions that celebrate the heterogeneity and vibrancy of the past. This can be a world of shifting and mobile becomings, not static, closed off and essentialised being. Typologies, as both Beck in this article and Fowler (2017, p. 96) argue, are assemblages too. However, typologies also pose challenges for those of us interested in assemblagebased thinking, and indeed its related cousins across new materialism (for a review of these different theories and their interrelation see Harris and Cipolla 2017). If forms emerge simply as temporarily stabilised gatherings of humans and non-humans, why do we see them recurring again and again (cf. Olivier 2011, p. 194)? Why was it ever possible to identify the Trelleborg House as a type at all? As Brian Massumi (2015, p. 87, original emphasis) puts it: ‘how are certain regularities enabled to re-emerge, across the variations, in always new forms?’ (cf. Fowler 2017). Those archaeologists that have relied on traditional approaches to typology have a simple answer: that there are such things as particular types and that these represent shared mental templates passed from person-to-person. However, as Beck points out, for assemblage theory (as well as the related ideas of processorientated archaeologists like Lesley McFadyen (e.g. 2016) and Colin Richards (2013)), such a reliance on an idea of imposed-final-form is problematic because of the way it suppresses difference and variation, relies on dualisms between mind and body, and enforces modern and anthropocentric ideas of design and planning on to the past. How then can assemblage theory both embrace the heterogeneity and contingency of the past, and explain the emergence of certain kinds of patterns? How, in other words, can we embrace both difference and repetition? Fowler (2017) has developed one-way forward in this regard by proposing the concept of relational typology. However, I suggest that there are further ways we can take this

中文翻译：

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走向虚拟类型学

Anna Beck 的论文是对考古学中关于组合理论的不断增长的文献的一个受欢迎的补充。它代表了仔细思考这种方法对考古思想最重要领域之一：类型学的影响的尝试。特别是在 Chris Fowler (2017) 和 Gavin Lucas (2012) 的工作基础上，考古学家开始展示将尖端理论与这种最顽固的考古概念联系起来的潜力。贝克正确地歪曲了标准类型学思维依赖于“理想类型”概念的方式，在她的案例中是完美的特瑞堡住宅，以及这种具有代表性的、柏拉图式的思维模式如何将考古学家困在一个有限且封闭的解释循环中。正如她正确地争论的那样，向组合理论的转变可以帮助我们为更复杂、更强大的描述腾出空间，以庆祝过去的异质性和活力。这可以是一个不断变化和移动的世界，而不是静止的、封闭的和本质化的存在。正如本文中的 Beck 和 Fowler (2017, p. 96) 所论证的，类型学也是组合。然而，类型学也给我们这些对基于组合的思维感兴趣的人带来了挑战，实际上它跨越了新唯物主义的相关表亲（有关这些不同理论及其相互关系的回顾，请参见 Harris 和 Cipolla 2017）。如果形式只是作为人类和非人类暂时稳定的聚会而出现，为什么我们会看到它们一次又一次地重复出现（参见 Olivier 2011，p. 194）？为什么有可能将特瑞堡住宅确定为一种类型？正如布赖恩·马苏米 (Brian Massumi) (2015, p. 87，最初的重点）提出：“某些规律如何能够以新的形式重新出现，跨越变化？” （参见福勒 2017 年）。那些依赖传统类型学方法的考古学家有一个简单的答案：存在诸如特定类型之类的东西，它们代表了人与人之间共享的心理模板。然而，正如 Beck 指出的那样，对于组合理论（以及 Lesley McFadyen（例如 2016）和 Colin Richards（2013）等面向过程的考古学家的相关思想），这种对强加最终形式思想的依赖是有问题的，因为它抑制差异和变化的方式，依赖于身心之间的二元论，并将现代和以人类为中心的设计和规划理念强加于过去。那么，组合理论如何既能接受过去的异质性和偶然性，又能解释某些类型模式的出现？换句话说，我们如何才能同时接受差异和重复？Fowler (2017) 通过提出关系类型学的概念，在这方面向前发展了一条路。但是，我建议我们可以通过其他方式来解决这个问题