ABSTRACT

The arising of unprofessional service in package tour makes conformance quality control increasingly important. This paper constructs a game model of dual-channel tourism supply chain composed of a traditional tour retail channel and an online channel under tourists’ quality preference. Focus on the condition that tour retailer provides extra service as differentiation strategy, the impacts of conformance quality on the decision-making of centralized and decentralized systems are analyzed with mathematical analysis, as well as the equilibrium conformance quality and the coordination strategy. This paper further compares the conformance quality and profits in centralized, decentralized, and coordinated systems and provides a sensitivity analysis of tourists’ quality preferences with numerical analysis. The results indicate that the conformance quality produces different impacts on the two channels. Decentralized structure is the dominant strategy, while centralized structure is more conductive to conformance quality control. The two-part tariff strategy is proposed and demonstrated to be effective in improving conformance quality. Tourists’ quality preferences are conductive to increasing the equilibrium conformance quality under certain conditions. This study provides guidance to the sustainable development of dual-channel tourism supply chain.

摘要

跟团旅游服务不专业的出现，使得合规质量控制变得越来越重要。本文构建了旅游者质量偏好下传统旅游零售渠道和在线渠道组成的双渠道旅游供应链博弈模型。以旅游零售商提供额外服务作为差异化策略的情况为中心，通过数学分析分析一致性质量对集中式和分散式系统决策的影响，以及均衡一致性质量和协调策略。本文进一步比较了集中式、分散式和协调系统中的一致性质量和利润，并通过数值分析提供了游客质量偏好的敏感性分析。结果表明，一致性质量对两个通道产生不同的影响。分散式结构是主导策略，而集中式结构更有利于一致性质量控制。提出并证明了两部分关税战略在提高合规质量方面是有效的。游客的质量偏好在一定条件下有利于提高均衡一致性质量。本研究为双渠道旅游供应链的可持续发展提供指导。游客的质量偏好在一定条件下有利于提高均衡一致性质量。本研究为双渠道旅游供应链的可持续发展提供指导。游客的质量偏好在一定条件下有利于提高均衡一致性质量。本研究为双渠道旅游供应链的可持续发展提供指导。