Critique comes in different styles, each doing different things. One form, not uncommon to contemporary cultural anthropology, is characterized more narrowly by what we might call criticism: a good text staves it off; a poor one is, sometimes viciously, torn apart. It can all feel—and the feeling part is important—rather uncomfortable at times. In the field of theory, where terms necessarily get a bit abstract, criticism abounds. In a typical pattern within this mode, one identifies a particular theoretical term or methodological practice and substitutes an alternative—usually one’s own, often not too different from the first, but usually different enough. Sometimes this is genuinely helpful: advancing the field, improving connections, refining concepts; sometimes it is not: advancing one author at the expense of another, improving the publicity of a perspective, refining poetics but toward the virtuosity rather than the intelligibility of description. With its focus on sometimes abstract phenomena relative to feelings, the three anthropological subfields with which this volume most engages—emotion, affect, and the sensory/somatic—can on occasion be prone to this style of critique, polarizing those with whom we have most in common. This is rather unfortunate and ironic given the potential for affect studies to bring us in closer touch with one another. As Kathleen Stewart says of it, “Affect studies, then, is one of the current approaches that present the possibility of sidestepping the dualist dead ends of modernist, humanist social science and its unfortunate affective habits of snapping at the world as if the whole point of being and thinking is just to catch it in a lie” (Stewart 2017, 196). That styles of critique also have their affective tones—some a bit uncomfortable—is not, then, an incidental reflection; rather, it is an ethnographic observation that affective styles of critique do things: they have effects; they structure practices of generating knowledge. As such, a critical mode of critique, says Stewart, can thus be rather paranoid, cutting us off from precisely the other with whom we entered the field to connect.

中文翻译：

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“感受（与）日本”评论：作为情感与感官人类学联系的批判

批评有不同的风格，每个人都做不同的事情。一种形式在当代文化人类学中并不少见，其更狭隘的特征是我们可以称之为批评的东西：好的文本可以避免它；一个可怜的人有时会被恶毒地撕裂。这一切都会让人感到——而且感觉部分很重要——有时会很不舒服。在理论领域，术语必然变得有点抽象，批评比比皆是。在这种模式中的典型模式中，人们确定一个特定的理论术语或方法论实践，并用一个替代方案来替代——通常是自己的，通常与第一个没有太大不同，但通常足够不同。有时这真的很有帮助：推进该领域，改善联系，完善概念；有时不是：以牺牲另一位作者为代价提升一位作者，提高视角的宣传，提炼诗学，但要追求技巧而不是描述的可理解性。由于有时关注与感觉相关的抽象现象，因此本书最关注的三个人类学子领域——情感、情感和感官/躯体——有时会倾向于这种批评风格，使我们最喜欢的人两极分化共同点。考虑到情感研究有可能让我们彼此更密切地接触，这是相当不幸和讽刺的。正如凯瑟琳·斯图尔特 (Kathleen Stewart) 所说，“那么，影响研究是当前的方法之一，它提出了避开现代主义的二元论死胡同的可能性，人文主义社会科学及其令人遗憾的情感习惯，即对世界进行抨击，就好像存在和思考的全部意义只是为了抓住它在谎言中”（Stewart 2017, 196）。批评的风格也有其情感基调——有些有点不舒服——不是偶然的反映；相反，它是一种人种学观察，即情感批评风格做事：它们有效果；它们构建了生成知识的实践。因此，斯图尔特说，批判的批评模式可能会相当偏执，将我们与我们进入该领域并与之建立联系的另一个人切断。这是一种人种学观察，即情感的批评风格会做事：它们有效果；它们构建了生成知识的实践。因此，斯图尔特说，批判的批评模式可能会相当偏执，将我们与我们进入该领域并与之建立联系的另一个人切断。这是一种人种学观察，即情感的批评风格会做事：它们有效果；它们构建了生成知识的实践。因此，斯图尔特说，批判的批评模式可能会相当偏执，将我们与我们进入该领域并与之建立联系的另一个人切断。