ABSTRACT

Can elections serve as vector of good public policy in fledgling democracies where electorally persistent elites circumvent institutional safeguards? Examining legislative productivity for each member of the Philippine House of Representatives from 1992 to 2016, we argue that while electoral persistence can be short-run welfare enhancing by inducing legislative attention on particularistic policies, it is ultimately electoral competition and the prospect of ouster that determine overall legislative behaviour. Using various measures of electoral competition, our panel estimates suggest that district incumbents who faced competitive elections, regardless of political pedigree, are more likely to work for the passage of their legislative proposals into legislation. The results lend credence to the disciplining effect of elections, even in precarious political settings where competition is between equally persistent political elites. Overall, incumbents who fought competitive elections are generally more likely to produce laws as a legislative preoccupation – a commitment they are likely to pursue even in the presence of institutional and political uncertainties.

摘要

在刚起步的民主国家中，选举能否成为良好的公共政策的载体？从1992年至2016年，对菲律宾众议院每个议员的立法效率进行了研究，我们认为，虽然选举的持久性可以通过引起立法对特殊政策的关注来提高短期福利，但最终是选举竞争和罢免的前景决定了总体立法行为。我们的小组使用各种选举竞争衡量方法估计，无论政治血统如何，面临竞争性选举的地区在位者都更有可能将其立法建议通过立法。结果有力地证明了选举的纪律性，即使在不稳定的政治环境中，竞争也是同样顽强的政治精英之间的竞争。总体而言，参加竞争性选举的在职者通常更倾向于制定法律，将其作为立法重点，即使在存在制度和政治不确定性的情况下，他们也可能会遵循这一承诺。