Abstract Deleuze’s philosophy of painting can be seen to pose certain challenges to a phenomenological approach to philosophy. While a phenomenological response to Deleuze’s philosophy is clearly needed, I show in this article how an approach taken in a recent paper by Christian Lotz proves inadequate. Lotz argues that through Deleuze’s refusal to accept the place of representation in art, he is unable to distinguish art from decoration, or to give a coherent account of how the (non-representational) content of art can be represented. I show that this criticism emerges from a misreading of the place of representation in Deleuze’s philosophy. I will argue that by failing to take account of some of the key features of Deleuze’s wider ontology, such as the importance of both the virtual and the actual for his analysis of objects, Lotz’s critique proves unsuccessful. In particular, I want to show that Lotz’s criticisms rest on a failure to attend to the systematic nature of Deleuze’s philosophy, and in particular, the place of Deleuze’s analysis of Bacon within the system as a whole. I will further show that Lotz’s phenomenological defence commits the fallacy of petitio principii, assuming the validity of the phenomenological method in order to justify the phenomenological approach.

中文翻译：

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表现与感觉-德勒兹绘画哲学的辩护

摘要德勒兹的绘画哲学可以看作是对现象学哲学方法提出的某些挑战。尽管显然需要对德勒兹的哲学进行现象学上的回应，但我在本文中展示了克里斯蒂安·洛兹（Christian Lotz）在最近的一篇论文中采用的方法是如何证明是不足的。洛兹认为，由于德勒兹拒绝接受艺术中的表现形式，他无法区分艺术与装饰，也无法对艺术的（非表现性）内容如何表现出一种连贯的解释。我表明，这种批评源于对德勒兹哲学中代表位置的误读。我将争辩说，由于没有考虑Deleuze广泛本体论的某些关键特征，例如虚拟和实际对于他分析对象的重要性，事实证明，洛兹的批评没有成功。我要特别指出的是，洛兹的批评在于未能关注德勒兹哲学的系统性，尤其是德勒兹对培根的分析在整个系统中的地位。我将进一步证明，假设现象学方法的有效性以证明现象学方法是正确的，那么洛茨的现象学防御就是犯下了小法则的谬误。