Abstract In this paper we discuss Heidegger’s conception of philosophy in the Black Notebooks. In particular, we set out a reading of the Notebooks from the 1930s and early 1940s as exhibiting an extremist view of philosophy, and its concern with being, which accords it an absolute and exclusive priority above and beyond everything else. We argue that such overcompensation for philosophy’s declining fortune involves a willful turning away from the realities of human life, and from the multifarious symbolic and functional worlds in which the meaning of being is articulated, refracted, and lived by individuals. In contrast, we suggest that Heidegger’s early Freiburg lecture courses already contain the basis for a critique of such an inflated notion of philosophy, and that the shift in Heidegger’s thinking in the late 1940s—away from an onto-historical and towards a topological understanding—is a consequence of Heidegger’s own reaction against the extremity of his thinking, and a turning back to the properly human dimensions of thinking and the matters that call for thinking.

中文翻译：

---

关于高估的哲学：海德格尔《黑色笔记本》的教训

摘要本文讨论了《黑笔记本》中海德格尔的哲学概念。特别是，我们对1930年代和1940年代初的笔记本进行了阅读，展示了哲学的极端主义观点及其对存在的关注，这使它成为绝对优先于一切的绝对优先事项。我们认为，对哲学的衰落进行这种过度补偿需要有意地放弃人类生活的现实，以及偏离个体所表达，折射和生活的意义广泛的象征性和功能性世界。相反，我们建议海德格尔早期的弗莱堡演讲课程已经包含了对这种夸大的哲学观念进行批判的基础，