ABSTRACT The distinction between ‘context of discovery’ and ‘context of justification’ in philosophy of science appears simple at first but contains interesting complexities. Paul Hoyningen-Huene has catalogued some of these complexities and suggested that the core usefulness of the ‘context distinction’ is in distinguishing between descriptive and normative perspectives. Here, I expand on Hoyningen-Huene’s project by tracing the label ‘context of discovery and context of justification’ to its origin. I argue that, contrary to initial appearances, Hans Reichenbach’s initial context distinction from 1938 does not easily map onto Hoyningen-Huene’s distinction between descriptive and normative perspectives on science. However, this is not a reason to reject Hoyningen-Huene’s simplified context distinction, nor do I recommend returning to Reichenbach’s initial proposal. It is, however, further reason to believe that the context distinction does not have a single, easily understood meaning. Along the way, I revisit Reichenbach’s version of ‘rational reconstruction’ and highlight its usefulness as a tool for philosophy in general.

中文翻译：

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赖兴巴赫瀑布-还有上升？重构发现/合理性区分

摘要科学哲学中“发现的背景”与“辩护的背景”之间的区别起初看起来很简单，但是却包含了有趣的复杂性。Paul Hoyningen-Huene对这些复杂性进行了分类，并建议“上下文区分”的核心作用是区分描述性和规范性观点。在这里，我通过追溯标签“发现的上下文和辩护的上下文”来追溯Hoyningen-Huene的项目。我认为，与最初的出现相反，汉斯·赖兴巴赫（Hans Reichenbach）从1938年开始的初始语境区分并不能轻易地映射到霍宁根·惠恩（Hoyningen-Huene）对科学的描述性和规范性观点之间的区分。但是，这并不是拒绝Hoyningen-Huene简化的上下文区分的理由，我也不建议返回赖兴巴赫的最初建议。但是，还有进一步的理由可以相信，上下文区分没有单一的，易于理解的含义。在此过程中，我重新审视了赖兴巴赫（Reichenbach）的“理性重建”版本，并着重强调了其作为一般哲学工具的有用性。