Five territories of the United States, plus the District of Columbia, send six non-voting delegates to the United States House of Representatives. While these delegates lack a vote to pass bills, they can serve on committees and advance to subcommittee chair, a position that facilitates Island representation via oversight and legislative activity concerning the federal agency with jurisdiction over territory policy. But aspiration to institutional power requires acceding to the partisan rules and norms of the House; hence, a tension arises between territorial representation and party loyalty. Majority parties under unified government minimise oversight of the executive branch in favour of legislative activism, while Island territories value oversight regardless of party power. Accordingly, under unified government, delegates are less likely to serve as subcommittee chairs than under divided government when their party does not control the executive branch. Once chosen as subcommittee chair, they pursue greater executive oversight than a chair with full voting privileges, while exercising party discipline by curbing oversight activity under unified government. This trade-off is an adaptation to empire in exchange for a degree of representation and authority within the metropole.

中文翻译：

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有关美国太平洋岛屿地区的监督和立法活动：党派和自治的平衡

美国的五个领土加上哥伦比亚特区，派出六名无投票权的代表前往美国众议院。尽管这些代表没有表决权通过法案，但他们可以在委员会中任职并晋升为小组委员会主席，这一职位通过对联邦政府对领土政策具有管辖权的监督和立法活动，促进了岛屿的代表。但是，要想获得机构权力，就必须加入众议院的党派规则和规范。因此，在领土代表制与政党忠诚之间会产生紧张关系。统一政府下的多数政党通过立法行动主义将对行政部门的监督降到最低，而岛屿领土则视政党的权力而忽视监督。因此，在统一政府下，当代表的政党不控制行政部门时，代表们担任分委员会主席的可能性要小于分权政府。一旦被选为小组委员会主席，他们将比拥有完全表决权的主席进行更大的行政监督，同时通过限制统一政府下的监督活动来行使党纪。这种权衡是对帝国的适应，以换取大都市圈内一定程度的代表性和权威。