This article focuses on the secure routing problem in the decentralized Internet of Things (IoT). We consider a typical decentralized IoT scenario composed of peer legitimate devices, unauthorized devices (eavesdroppers), and selfish helper jamming devices (jammers), and propose a novel incentive jamming-based secure routing scheme. For a pair of source and destination, we first provide theoretical modeling to reveal how the transmission security performance of a given route is related to the jamming power of jammers in the IoT. Then, we design an incentive mechanism with which the source pays some rewards to stimulate the artificial jamming among selfish jammers, and also develop a two-stage Stackelberg game framework to determine the optimal source rewards and jamming power. Finally, with the help of the theoretical modeling as well as the source rewards and jamming power setting results, we formulate a shortest weighted path-finding problem to identify the optimal route for secure data delivery between the source–destination pair, which can be solved by employing the Dijkstra’s or Bellman–Ford algorithm. We prove that the proposed routing scheme is individually rational, stable, distributed, and computationally efficient. Simulation and numerical results are provided to demonstrate the performance of our routing scheme.

中文翻译：

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分散式物联网中基于激励干扰的安全路由

本文重点介绍去中心化物联网（IoT）中的安全路由问题。我们考虑由对等合法设备，未经授权的设备（窃听者）和自私的助手干扰设备（干扰者）组成的典型分散式物联网场景，并提出一种新颖的基于激励干扰的安全路由方案。对于一对源和目标，我们首先提供理论模型，以揭示给定路由的传输安全性能如何与物联网中干扰源的干扰能力相关。然后，我们设计了一种激励机制，通过该机制，源可以奖励一些报酬，以刺激自私干扰者的人为干扰，并开发一个两阶段的Stackelberg游戏框架，以确定最佳的源奖励和干扰能力。最后，借助理论建模以及源奖励和干扰功率设置结果，我们制定了最短的加权路径查找问题，以确定在源-目标对之间安全传输数据的最佳路径，可以通过采用以下方法解决Dijkstra或Bellman-Ford算法。我们证明了所提出的路由方案是个体合理的，稳定的，分布式的和计算有效的。提供了仿真和数值结果，以证明我们的路由方案的性能。我们证明了所提出的路由方案是个体合理的，稳定的，分布式的和计算有效的。提供了仿真和数值结果，以证明我们的路由方案的性能。我们证明了所提出的路由方案是个体合理的，稳定的，分布式的和计算有效的。提供了仿真和数值结果，以证明我们的路由方案的性能。