ABSTRACT

State–business relations are considered the key to explaining long-term economic growth. However, the fact that there is neither an ideal nor convergent model of such relations requires us to explore political arrangements that underpin them. This article proposes a modified social conflict approach to state–business relations that incorporates into the analysis the role of intra-elite contestation, marginalised groups, and different kinds of leading economic actor, with a case study of Thailand. It argues that, from 1980 to 1997, Thailand’s economic development occurred within the context of multifaceted conflicts and power fragmentation. Banking oligopolies played a leading role in resource allocation that took Thailand to a path of high growth, high inequality and low technological capabilities. Social conflict in the post-1997 era has shifted towards power consolidation, centring on the tussle between the traditional elite and elected politicians. Thaksin’s growth regime (2001–2006) was state-led in character, with profound populist–redistributive impacts. Two military coups in 2006 and 2014 did not change this consolidated structure. The junta replaced Thaksin at the top of the pecking order and rearranged the inner–outer circles of its own clientelistic networks. This evolution of social conflict has rendered Thailand’s economic development increasingly opposing to the notion of inclusive growth.

摘要

国企关系被认为是解释长期经济增长的关键。然而，这种关系既没有理想模型也没有收敛模型这一事实要求我们探索支撑它们的政治安排。本文提出了一种修正的社会冲突方法来处理国家-企业关系，将精英内部竞争、边缘化群体和不同类型的主要经济参与者的作用纳入分析，并以泰国为例。认为，1980年至1997年，泰国的经济发展发生在多方面冲突和权力分散的背景下。银行业寡头在资源配置中发挥了主导作用，使泰国走上了高增长、高不平等和低技术能力的道路。1997 年后时代的社会冲突已转向权力巩固，集中在传统精英和民选政客之间的斗争上。他信的增长体制（2001-2006 年）具有国家主导的特征，具有深远的民粹主义再分配影响。2006 年和 2014 年的两次军事政变并没有改变这种合并结构。军政府取代了他信处于等级最高的位置，并重新安排了自己的客户主义网络的内外圈子。社会冲突的这种演变使泰国的经济发展越来越反对包容性增长的概念。2006 年和 2014 年的两次军事政变并没有改变这种合并结构。军政府取代了他信处于等级最高的位置，并重新安排了自己的客户主义网络的内外圈子。社会冲突的这种演变使泰国的经济发展越来越反对包容性增长的概念。2006 年和 2014 年的两次军事政变并没有改变这种合并结构。军政府取代了他信处于等级最高的位置，并重新安排了自己的客户主义网络的内外圈子。社会冲突的这种演变使泰国的经济发展越来越反对包容性增长的概念。